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Abstract 
 
The paper presents a first set of results for Spain and Italy using the EUKLEMS database. 
It emphasizes the different paths followed by the two countries over the last thirty five 
years, even though they still have many features in common. The motivation behind this 
paper is the poor productivity performance that the two countries have shown recently. 
The general overview details the factors underlying the process of per capita income 
convergence. Productivity performance is highlighted as the driving factor of 
convergence, deserving the greatest attention from different perspectives: the 
contributions of the different sources of productivity growth, which make use of the 
growth accounting framework; the impact of the structural change undergone by the two 
countries while moving from economies with still important shares of the agricultural 
sector to a more modern one; or the responsibility of poor productivity improvements in 
given industries. The changing composition of labour also deserves a detailed analysis 
because of its importance in productivity over the period analyzed.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Spain and Italy are two Southern European countries that have a great deal in common, 
even though their points of departure were very different. Italy’s entrance into modernity 
can be traced back to the end of World War II, while in Spain the 1936-1939 Civil War –
and the dark years that followed it- delayed its moving forward until the 1960s. This 
chapter is devoted to analyzing the path followed by these two countries in the long run, 
allowing the convergence process that has taken place between the two countries over 
the last years to be put into perspective.      
Spain was, in 1970, an isolated country in the international scene, with a dictator in 
power. On the contrary, Italy was one of the founding countries of the present European 
Union (EU), being a democracy since the end of WWII. However, they had many points 
in common: their agricultural sector had a high weight in the aggregate; they had similar 
industrial specialization, with an important presence of traditional sectors such as 
textiles, footwear and furniture; both countries had a source of wealth in the tourist 
sector; in addition, they also shared low activity rates, especially women’s, and low 
schooling levels, etc. At that time, Spanish economists had Italy as the example to 
follow. Thirty years later, things have changed dramatically, with Spain almost catching 
up Italian per capita income. 
Italy was the first of the Southern European countries to be integrated into an 
institutional system of international free trade. Its economy was a moving force with its 
very strong level of integration both with Continental Europe and with international trade 
(Guerrieri and Milana, 1993). The increase in the latter was one of the main causes of its 
economic development in the second post-war period. The opening up to the 
international markets of an economy already based on a solid structure of capital goods, 
and of a consistent system of small and medium sized firms laid the foundation for rapid 
industrial growth. The timing of the opening up of the economy to foreign market was 
decisive in the process of industrialization (Himler and Milana, 1984, 1988). A relatively 
rapid economic growth in the early post-war period and a consolidation of the 
industrialization process during the seventies and the eighties have positioned Italy 
among the G8 group and has gained it world top brands in a number of sectors including 
fashion, apparel, clothing, and footwear as well as high-tech sports cars. Notwithstanding 
these achievements, Italy has not fully succeded in getting rid of profound structural 
weaknesses.  
On the contrary, Spain was an isolated country that only started opening up its economy 
in 1959, after the approval of the Stabilization Plan that year. However, it had to face the 
full force of competition in the middle of the international crisis caused by the oil price 
wars in the seventies. This fact forced the country into a difficult situation of intensive 
capitalistic growth based on labour-saving technologies, and on the shrinking of the 
industrial base. The consequences on employment were very heavy, reaching extremely 
high unemployment rates, especially among women and the youth.  
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Spain became a democracy after Franco’s death in 1975, approving its Democratic 
Constitution in 1978. If these two dates can be considered very relevant, at least as 
important in the shaping of what Spain is nowadays was its entrance in the European 
Union in 1986. The consequences on the Spanish economy of joining the EU cannot be 
underestimated. Its influence spread throughout all aspects of the economy and social 
relations, contributing definitively to its modernization. Capital accumulation benefited 
strongly by being a backward country eligible, therefore, for the Structural Funds and 
Cohesion Fund of the EU. Infrastructures´ endowments –linked to a great extent to EU 
grants- experienced a strong upturn, growing at a faster rate than other forms of capital. 
While in 1986 infrastructures represented 18.1% of the total non residential net capital 
stock, in 2005 its share was more than two percentage points higher (20.4) (Mas, Pérez 
and Uriel, 2007). This inflow of funds had at least two consequences: it definitively 
contributed to Spanish economic growth; and perhaps more importantly, it contributed 
positively to regional convergence.     
The regional dimension of Spanish economic growth became an outstanding issue with 
the creation of the so called Estado de las Autonomías3 by the 1978 Constitution. As in 
the case of Italy, Spain also had a north/south problem which its integration to the EU –
with its strong regional cohesion policy- helped to alleviate. In the fifties and sixties of 
the past century, both countries experienced strong migration flows either to other 
European countries, or more developed regions within the country. In the case of Spain, 
the result was the depopulation of the center –with the big exception of Madrid and its 
area of influence- and the mountain areas, and the parallel movement of the activity to 
the coast, especially the Mediterranean coast. As for Italy, the movement was from the 
impoverished south to the much more dynamic north. The North-South economic gap 
has not been substantially reduced over the last decades, except in a couple of regions 
near Central Italy. This has left the country with social problems and world-wide known 
organized crime networks that have tarnished its global image. Thus, for both countries 
national growth is not the only target. At least as important is its share among the 
regions, and more specifically their convergence in terms of per capita income and 
productivity4. 
Among the main changes that have occurred in Italy during the last two decades, two 
epocal facts are usually pointed out: one is the deindustrialization of the economy with 
an increase in the proportion of jobs in service industries and the other is the world-wide 
ICT revolution that has affected many sectors, although at a lesser extent with respect to 
other major European countries (Ginsborg, 2006). In the manufacturing industry, the 
fordist model is definitely replaced by “lighter” ways of production, based on the massive 
introduction of robotics in the production processes.  Important restructuring activities 
have been undertaken during the eighties and early nineties bringing about gains in 
productivity comparable with those of other industrialized economies. The country’s 
                                                 
 
3 Comunidades Autónomas (Autonomías for short) is the name given in Spain to the European NUTS II regions 
4 Regional convergence –and the role played by different forms of capital, especially infrastructures- has 
received a lot of attention, at least since Aschauer´s (1989) seminal work (for the Spanish case see Mas, 
Maudos, Pérez, Uriel (1996, 1998); and Tortosa, Pérez, Mas and Goerlich (2005) and the works there cited).  
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specialization in traditional products have led to a flourishing of small and medium sized 
firms that have widespread outside the traditional triangolo industriale centered in 
Lombardy, Piedmont, and Liguria, and moved towards the North-East regions and the 
so-called “industrial districts”. But institutional settings and fiscal regimes, which have 
always been relatively unfriendly with fast growing firms, have prevented, with very few 
exceptions, the small- and medium-sized enterprises to grow into large-sized firms and 
operate competitively in international markets.  
With these references in mind, the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an 
overview of the performance of the two economies from a long term perspective. A more 
detailed analysis from the industries perspective is offered in sections 3 and 4. Section 5 
concentrates on the changing composition of labour in the two countries, while section 6 
presents the main conclusions and policy recommendations.  
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2. OVERVIEW 
Even though Italy and Spain share many things in common, the former has traditionally 
enjoyed one of the highest per capita incomes within the group of the most industrialized 
countries of the world. On the contrary, Spain started the 70s in a rather backward 
position, with a per capita income markedly lower than the European Union (EU) 
average. In this section we revise the behaviour followed by the two countries in the last 
thirty years from an aggregate perspective. 
Per capita income is the variable that deserves the most prominent attention in the 
evaluation of the performance of the economies, and it is usually considered as a 
reasonably good approximation of economic welfare as well. For these reasons, before 
going into a more detailed analysis of productivity -to which the EU KLEMS project is 
devoted - we will look briefly at per capita income levels and time profiles in both 
countries. Before doing so it is convenient to take as reference a rather useful 
decomposition of per capita income. This decomposition is provided by expression 2.1, 
which is in fact an identity:   
 
GVA GVA H L LF
P H L LF P
≡  [2.1] 
where GVA stands for Gross Value Added; P for total population; H are total hours 
worked; L is total employment (in persons); and LF represents the labour force. 
Therefore, the first term in expression 2.1 (GVA/H) measures labour productivity in 
terms of hours worked;  the second (H/L), the number of hours worked per employed 
person; the third (L/LF) the employment rate; and the last component (LF/P) the activity 
rate defined with respect to total population. Figure 2.1 plots the five variables for the 
period 1980-2005.  
Panel a) shows the ratio between Italy and Spain for the first two variables in expression 
2.1, per capita income and labour productivity (hours worked) in nominal terms5. The 
main messages of this panel are the following. In the first place, it confirms that both 
variables have been traditionally higher in Italy than in Spain, the discrepancy amounting 
to almost 50% in per capita income and 30% in labour productivity in 1980. In the 
second place, it shows the widening of the gap in the first half of the 80s, after the 
second oil shock with very adverse effects on the Spanish economy. Finally, and most 
importantly, it clearly illustrates the reduction of the differences, much more intense in 
terms of per capita income than labour productivity. In fact, in 2005 both variables were 
about 16% higher in Italy than in Spain. Therefore, a process of convergence between 
the two countries –not yet fulfilled- has taken place over the period6.  
                                                 
 
5 We use GVA in nominal terms because we are interested in the relative position of the two countries in a 
given moment of time. 
6 According to a EUROSTAT recent release, in 2006 Spanish per capita income was slightly higher than Italy. 
This result is obtained if instead of using Gross Value Added in current basic prices, as in figure 2.1, Gross 
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FIGURE 2.1: Convergence in VA per head and its components 
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Panel b) shows the second component of per capita income. Here the messages are also 
clear. Firstly, the number of hours worked by Italian workers have been almost always 
(the only slight exceptions are the first two years of the 80s) higher than in Spain, and 
also higher than in the EU-15 average7. Secondly, while in Spain this variable 
experienced a marked reduction –in line with the profile shown by the EU-15- in Italy the 
reduction has been much less intense.  
Panel c) illustrates the well known extremely high rates of unemployment suffered by the 
Spanish economy until very recently. At some point in time, around the mid-90s, it 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
Domestic Product expressed in terms of PPS is used. In figure 2.1 we use the EUKLEMS GVA information, 
without correcting for PPS. In section 4.3 (table 4.2) we offer similar information using EUKLEMS PPS data. In 
this case the productivity differential between the two countries was 10% in 2005. Thus, according to these 
information, Spain has not overtaken Italy yet. 
7 Panel a) did not include the information for EU-15 since the information of Value Added for this aggregate in 
the EUKLEMS database is not comparable with the one for the individual countries (for EU-15 it is expressed in 
PPS while for Spain and Italy it is expressed either in nominal terms or in 1995 euros). 
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reached a 20% unemployment rate. Since then it has shown an astonishing capacity of 
employment creation, allowing to almost close the gap with both Italy and the EU-15.  
Finally, panel d) shows one of the historical problems of both Italian and Spanish 
economies: their relatively low levels of activity rates. For Spain the situation was 
especially adverse at the beginning of the 80s, mainly as a consequence of the low 
female participation rate, as will be analyzed in detail in section 5. However, its recovery 
has also been very important. Since the mid-90s, it has overtaken the Italian rate not 
only because of the increase in women’s involvement in the labour market, but also 
because of the wave of immigration that Spain has been experiencing since then.  
Revising the components of per capita income behaviour, expression 1 allows us to 
quantify the relative importance of each one of them. Taking logs we can obtain both the 
time evolution of each variable, as well as its contribution to per capita income in each 
point of time. Furthermore, if we deduct the Spanish figures from the Italian ones, the 
relative importance of each component in per capita income differences can be tracked. 
Table 2.1 shows the percentage contribution of each component. 
TABLE 2.1: Nominal GVA per capita decomposition. Italy minus Spain 
(GVA per capita differences =100) 
1980 1995 2000 2005
Labour productivity 61,91 50,01 77,36 86,35
Hours worked by employed person -6,16 19,74 27,02 55,16
Employment rate 21,89 28,85 11,33 16,71
Activity rate 22,35 1,40 -15,71 -58,22
GVA per capita 100,00 100,00 100,00 100,00
Source: EU KLEMS Database, March 2008, http://www.euklems.net and own calculations.  
As expected, labour productivity has been the main determinant of per capita income 
differences between the two countries. However, its importance has not been constant 
over the period analyzed. Additionally, the role played by the other three variables is also 
shown. The higher number of hours worked in Italy acts in favour of its relatively higher 
per capita income, while its lower activity rate exerts the opposite force. The very high 
Spanish unemployment rate pushed down its relatively lower per capita income until the 
beginning of the new century.  
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY 
Labour productivity is the main factor conditioning per capita income growth. For that 
reason, in the next section we will concentrate on presenting its main features over the 
period, while later sections will provide further details. Table 2.2 presents the rate of 
growth of Gross Value Added (GVA), employment (in hours worked), and labour 
productivity expressed in real terms and in hours worked. The table distinguishes 
between the whole period 1970-2005, and different relevant sub periods. The main 
messages are the following: 
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TABLE 2.2: Real gross value added (GVA), employment (hours worked) and labour productivity. 
Total economy 
(Annual rates of growth in %) 
Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain
Real GVA 2,27 3,05 2,70 2,89 1,19 3,45 1,77 3,88 0,61 3,02
Employment (hours worked) 0,54 0,89 0,41 0,00 0,85 3,10 1,00 3,76 0,69 2,44
Labour productivity 1,73 2,16 2,29 2,89 0,34 0,35 0,77 0,11 -0,08 0,58
Source: EU KLEMS Database, March 2008, http://www.euklems.net and own calculations
2000-20051970-2005 1970-1995 1995-2005 1995-2000
 
In the first place it shows that over the whole period Spain has shown a more dynamic 
behaviour than Italy in the three variables. In the second, it shows the difficulties faced 
by the two countries, especially for Spain, in creating jobs during the first twenty five 
year period, between 1970 and 1995. Things changed drastically in the following ten 
years. In the period 1995-2005, both countries experienced a productivity slowdown, but 
while in Spain both GVA and employment grew at a very fast rate, in Italy both variables 
showed a sluggish pace.  In the third place, when dividing the last decade into two 
different periods, a different behaviour pattern between the two countries can also be 
observed. Spanish productivity deceleration over 1995-2000 partly recovered in the 
following sub period, while Italy fell a bit more,  even showing a negative sign in the last 
five years considered. 
Taking all this into account, what table 2.2 shows is that both countries enjoyed their 
highest rate of labour productivity growth in 1970-1995, precisely the years when they 
faced the strongest difficulties creating employment. In the most recent years both 
countries have shown a weak productivity performance, but while in Spain GVA and 
employment grew at a fast pace, Italy’s performance has been less dynamic. 
Table 2.3 offers a wider perspective in the most recent period, putting both countries in 
the context of the four different countries´ aggregates provided by the EU KLEMS 
database. As can be seen, Spain and Italy have shown the lowest productivity growth, 
but while Spain presented the highest rate of GVA and employment growth, Italy’s GVA 
growth rate was the lowest. 
TABLE 2.3: Real gross value added (GVA), employment (hours worked) and labour productivity. 
Total economy 
(Annual rates of growth in %) 
GVA
Employ-
ment
Labour 
produc-
tivity
GVA
Employ-
ment
Labour 
produc-
tivity
GVA
Employ-
ment
Labour 
produc-
tivity
Italy 1,19 0,85 0,34 1,77 1,00 0,77 0,61 0,69 -0,08
Spain 3,45 3,10 0,35 3,88 3,76 0,11 3,02 2,44 0,58
EU-10 (New Member States) 3,14 -0,35 3,48 3,28 0,19 3,09 3,00 -0,88 3,88
EU-15ex¹ 2,03 0,76 1,27 2,58 1,10 1,48 1,48 0,42 1,07
EU-15 (Old Member States) 2,15 0,78 1,37 2,69 1,11 1,58 1,60 0,44 1,17
EU-25 2,24 0,59 1,65 2,74 0,96 1,78 1,74 0,22 1,51
1 The EU-15ex consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom
Source: EU KLEMS Database, March 2008, http://www.euklems.net and own calculations
1995-2005 1995-2000 2000-2005
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FACTORS OF PRODUCTION 
Output growth –and also productivity growth- requires the increased use of factors of 
production, as well as technological improvements. From the aggregate perspective, it 
also needs to specialize in industries with high value added, and which are able to 
compete in the international markets. In this section we provide a brief overlook of the 
behaviour followed by the factors of production.  
The difficulties faced by both countries in encouraging productivity growth are partly 
balanced by their ability to create new jobs. Table 2.4 shows the weight of the two 
countries on total EU employment creation. In the most recent period, 1995-2005, Spain 
contributed with 30.3% and Italy with 13.4%, of the total net employment increase in 
the UE-25. Between 2000 and 2005 net employment creation in the two countries 
represented 64.6% of all net employment creation in EU-25 and 60.8% in EU-15 (old 
member states). Therefore, while both countries have been a burden to EU productivity 
growth, they have also been the drivers of labour growth, especially Spain.  
TABLE 2.4: Net employment creation 
(Thousands of persons) 
1970-1995 1995-2005 1995-2000 2000-2005
Italy 1.910 2.492 1.089 1.403
As % of:
EU-15ex¹ 15,8 14,4 10,0 22,1
EU-15 (Old Member States) 14,3 13,1 9,0 20,3
EU-25 - 13,4 9,0 21,6
Spain 1.120 5.643 2.842 2.800
As % of:
EU-15ex¹ 9,2 32,7 26,0 44,2
EU-15 (Old Member States) 8,4 29,7 23,5 40,5
EU-25 - 30,3 23,5 43,1
Source: EU KLEMS Database, March 2008, http://www.euklems.net and own calculations
1 The EU-15ex consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, 
Spain and the United Kingdom
 
It was generally accepted, at least until Solow’s (1957) residual showed up, that capital 
accumulation, resulting from frugality and consumption postponement was the main 
engine of economic growth. Figure 2.2 plots the investment effort realized by Spain and 
Italy since 1970, as measured by the ratio between Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
(GFCF) and GVA. Until the mid-80s, both countries followed a similar path, but with Italy 
a step somewhat ahead of Spain. However, since the middle of the nineties Spain has 
clearly taken off, reaching a peak of 32% of GVA in 2005. The origin of this divergent 
behaviour can be found in the Non-ICT component of investment. While ICT investment 
–as percentage of GVA- followed a similar path in the two countries, Non-ICT 
experienced a strong take off, only weakly followed by Italy (Figure 2.3). 
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FIGURE 2.2: Investment effort. Gross Fixed Capital Formation as % of GVA. 1970-2005 
(Percentages) 
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FIGURE 2.3: Investment effort. ICT and Non-ICT. Gross Fixed Capital Formation as % of GVA. 
1970-2005 
(Percentages) 
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Source : EU KLEMS Database, March 2008, http://www.euklems.net and own calculations.
 
 
Table 2.5 summarizes capital services growth. Once again, we can observe the important 
differences existing between Italy and Spain. Capital accumulation in Spain was very 
strong, almost doubling Italy’s rate of growth in the most recent period 1995-2005. This 
result is the consequence of the fast speed of growth of the Non-ICT component, around 
4% per year in the period 1995-2005 and each of its two sub periods, twice the Italian 
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rate of growth. In terms of ICT capital accumulation, the behaviour of Spain has not 
been so remarkable, especially when compared with the EU-15ex or the USA. However, 
in the last sub period, 2000-2005, the rate of growth of ICT capital was 2.5 percentage 
points higher in Spain than in Italy. 
 
TABLE 2.5: Capital services. Total economy 
(Annual rates of growth in %) 
 
Total ICT Non-ICT Total ICT Non-ICT Total ICT Non-ICT
Italy 2,62 9,58 2,05 2,88 14,37 1,96 2,35 4,79 2,14
Spain 4,96 10,77 4,27 5,22 14,26 4,15 4,70 7,27 4,40
United States-SIC based 3,57 13,57 2,15 4,66 17,87 2,87 2,48 9,27 1,43
EU-15ex¹ 3,36 12,28 2,27 3,99 16,34 2,53 2,74 8,23 2,02
1 The EU-15ex consists of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom
Source: EU KLEMS Database, March 2008, http://www.euklems.net and own calculations
1995-2005 1995-2000 2000-2005
 
 
The above information allows us to carry out a more detailed analysis of both countries, 
to which the following sections are devoted.  
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3. TWO CONTRASTING GROWTH EXPERIENCES 
Figure 3.1 offers an overview of the two countries’ growth experiences in the 35 years 
covered by the EU KLEMS database. The data shown add to the standard classification 
separated information for Agriculture and Construction, two relevant industries for both 
countries already included in OtherG. Panel a) provides the information for Value Added 
(VA); panel b) for hours worked; and panel c) for labour productivity growth. The three 
panels distinguish between the first part of the period, from 1970 to 1995, and the most 
recent one, 1995-2005.  
Starting with panel a), the figure shows two facts. First, that during the 1970-1995 
period VA growth rates of both countries where rather similar, and second, it also shows 
that things changed drastically in the following years. While Spain experienced 
acceleration, in Italy the growth rate of VA halved with respect to the previous period.  
The general picture that emerges from panel a) is that: 1. In the most recent period 
Spain has outperformed Italy in terms of VA growth not only at the aggregate level but 
also in most of the seven sectoral aggregations considered; and 2. Whereas Spanish VA 
growth rates accelerated in the second sub period, 1995-2005, compared to the previous 
one, in Italy the opposite was true, with the construction industry being the only clear 
exception . 
A somewhat similar conclusion can be obtained in terms of hours worked. As panel b) 
indicates, the ability of the Spanish economy to create new jobs has been astonishing 
after 25 years of almost nil labour creation. Italy has also been able to increase its level 
of employment, but less intensively. However, while in Spain the acceleration of this 
variable spread over all sectoral aggregations, Italy experienced deceleration, with 
Construction being the only exception again. It is interesting to notice the opposite 
behaviour shown by the two countries in relation with Manufacturing employment. Italy 
experienced a negative growth rate both in Elecom and also in MaxElec8. On the 
contrary, Spanish manufacturing employment recovered after the negative behaviour of 
the previous 1970-1995 period.   
In spite of the different paces followed by the two countries in terms of VA and 
employment, the labour productivity behaviour -shown by panel c) - looks very similar. 
In both countries the deceleration of labour productivity was very intense and it spread 
through almost all sectors of the economy. The only exceptions were Finbu and Nonmar, 
while in Agriculture the deceleration was more than noticeable. It is also interesting to 
observe the sharp drop in the MaxElec aggregation, which includes the traditional 
manufacturing sectors in which both countries used to be specialized.  
 
                                                 
 
8 See in table 3.1 a detailed description of each aggregation acronym.  
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FIGURE 3.1: Value added, hours worked and labour productivity growth. 1970-1995 and 1995-2005 
(Percentages) 
  
 
Source: EU KLEMS Database, March 2008, http://www.euklems.net and own calculations
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Note: TOT=Total industries; ELECOM=Electrical machinery, post and communication services; 
MaxElec=Total manufacturing, excluding electrical; OtherG=Other production; DIST=Distribution; 
FINBU=Finance and business, except real estate; PERS=Personal services; and 
NONMAR=Non-market services.
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Figure 3.2 provides further insights into the two countries, contrasting Value Added 
behaviour. First, in the most recent period, 1995-2005, Spanish VA growth was 
dominated by strong labour creation, particularly in Construction and the three service 
sectoral aggregations, Distri¸ Finbu, and Pers. However, Agriculture experienced job 
destruction in both countries.  Second, MaxElec presented one of the lowest growth rate 
of output in both countries, especially in Italy, where labour creation in this sector was 
even negative. Third, the ICT producing sector Elecom showed a very strong increase in 
both countries, but with very different drivers. In Spain, its main driver was ICT capital 
accumulation, whereas Italy was more in line with other EU countries, having MFP as its 
main source of growth. Another important difference is that while in Spain this sector 
showed net employment creation, in Italy the opposite was true. Fourth, the ICT capital 
contribution to GDP growth has been higher in Spain than in Italy. This result has its 
origin almost exclusively in the Elecom sector. And finally, both countries share an 
almost general MFP negative contribution, particularly severe in the Pers and 
Construction industries. The only two exceptions were Agriculture in both countries and 
the Elecom industry in Italy, and the Finbu in Spain. 
FIGURE 3.2: Contributions to value added growth. 1995-2005 
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Figure 3.3 provides further information from the labour productivity perspective. In the 
1995-2005 period labour productivity growth was very low in both countries, awarding 
them the last positions in the ranking of the EU KLEMS sample of countries. By far, the 
most dynamic behaviour was presented by the Elecom aggregation. In Italy labour 
productivity growth in this sector approached 5% and in Spain 4%. Compared to these 
figures, the rest of the sectoral aggregations did not even reach half these rates, the 
only exception being the Italian Agriculture industry.  
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FIGURE 3.3: Contributions to labour productivity growth. 1995-2005 
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As already mentioned, MFP contributed negatively to productivity growth. In fact, the 
main force driving the very modest labour productivity growth in both countries was 
Non-ICT capital deepening. The only exception was Finbu, where in Italy its contribution 
was negative, and in Spain almost nil. ICT capital deepening was the second force, 
followed closely by the contribution of labour composition changes, especially in the 
Spanish case. As expected, ICT capital accumulation was very strong in the Elecom 
sector and also in two aggregations of sectors, characterized by using ICT intensively, 
Finbu and Distribution.  
So far we have highlighted the role played by the different sectors in the two countries´ 
productivity slowdown. However, the level of aggregation in the information provided in 
figures 3.1 to 3.3 is probably still too high. For that reason, table 3.1 takes into 
consideration the highest level of sectoral disaggregation in the EUKLEMS database. The 
main conclusions we can draw from the observation of these data are the following. In 
the first place, during the 1970-1995 period productivity growth in both countries was 
driven by the Agriculture industry. This industry was responsible for more than half 
labour productivity growth in Italy, and almost 70% (67.5%) in Spain. If this sector was 
to be excluded, the productivity deceleration would have been 1.0 pp lower in the case of 
Italy and 1.8 pp in Spain 
Other sectors which have played an important role in the productivity slowdown have 
been Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear; Electrical and optical equipment; 
Chemicals and Chemical products; and Basic metals and fabricated metal products. 
Notice that all of them belong to Manufacturing (MaxElec). The contribution of these 
sectors was especially negative in the case of Italy. In fact, the contribution of 
Manufactures to productivity deceleration in Italy has been of the same size as that of 
TABLE 3.1: Contribution to labour productivity growth 
(Percentages) 
 
Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain
TOTAL INDUSTRIES TOT 2,29 2,89 0,34 0,35 -1,95 -2,54
 MARKET ECONOMY MARKT 2,62 3,54 0,25 0,25 -2,37 -3,29
  ELECTRICAL MACHINERY, POST AND COMMUNICATION SERVICES ELECOM 0,19 0,12 0,13 0,05 -0,06 -0,07
   Electrical and optical equipment 30t33 0,16 0,06 0,01 0,01 -0,16 -0,05
   Post and telecommunications 64 0,02 0,06 0,12 0,04 0,10 -0,02
   TOTAL MANUFACTURING, EXCLUDING ELECTRICAL MexElec 0,91 0,75 0,02 0,06 -0,90 -0,69
     Food products, beverages and tobacco 15t16 0,06 0,12 -0,01 -0,01 -0,07 -0,13
     Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 17t19 0,28 0,14 -0,03 -0,01 -0,30 -0,15
     Wood and products of wood and cork 20 0,06 0,02 0,02 0,00 -0,04 -0,02
     Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 21t22 0,05 0,05 0,01 0,02 -0,05 -0,03
     Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel 23 0,00 0,00 -0,02 0,00 -0,03 0,00
     Chemicals and chemical products 24 0,13 0,07 0,01 0,00 -0,12 -0,07
     Rubber and plastics products 25 0,02 0,02 0,01 0,01 -0,01 -0,01
     Other non-metallic mineral products 26 0,07 0,10 0,02 0,02 -0,04 -0,09
     Basic metals and fabricated metal products 27t28 0,15 0,09 0,01 -0,02 -0,13 -0,10
     Machinery, nec 29 0,04 0,05 -0,02 0,00 -0,05 -0,05
     Transport equipment 34t35 0,03 0,07 0,00 0,03 -0,04 -0,04
     Manufacturing nec; recycling 36t37 0,03 0,03 0,01 0,02 -0,01 -0,01
   OTHER PRODUCTION OtherG 1,30 2,19 0,23 0,00 -1,07 -2,19
    Mining and quarrying C 0,01 0,04 0,00 0,01 -0,01 -0,03
    Electricity, gas and water supply E 0,01 0,03 0,02 0,03 0,02 0,00
    Construction F 0,10 0,17 -0,02 -0,18 -0,12 -0,35
    Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing AtB 1,19 1,95 0,22 0,14 -0,96 -1,81
   DISTRIBUTION DISTR 0,36 0,36 0,14 0,14 -0,21 -0,22
     Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of fuel 50 0,05 0,00 0,01 0,00 -0,04 0,01
     Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 51 0,06 0,02 0,01 0,00 -0,05 -0,02
     Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of household goods 52 0,16 0,15 0,13 0,11 -0,03 -0,03
    Transport and storage 60t63 0,09 0,20 0,00 0,02 -0,10 -0,18
   FINANCE AND BUSINESS, EXCEPT REAL ESTATE FINBU -0,06 -0,01 -0,11 0,14 -0,05 0,14
    Financial intermediation J -0,02 0,01 0,03 0,11 0,05 0,10
    Renting of m&eq and other business activities 71t74 -0,04 -0,02 -0,14 0,02 -0,10 0,04
   PERSONAL SERVICES PERS -0,07 0,12 -0,16 -0,12 -0,09 -0,24
    Hotels and restaurants H -0,04 0,02 -0,06 -0,09 -0,02 -0,11
    Other community, social and personal services O 0,01 -0,01 -0,04 0,00 -0,06 0,01
    Private households with employed persons P -0,05 0,11 -0,05 -0,03 -0,01 -0,14
 NON-MARKET SERVICES NONMAR 0,04 -0,05 0,19 0,10 0,14 0,15
   Public admin and defence; compulsory social security L 0,01 -0,04 0,13 0,11 0,12 0,15
   Education M 0,01 0,01 0,00 0,04 -0,01 0,04
   Health and social work N 0,02 -0,02 0,05 -0,02 0,02 0,00
  Real estate activities 70 0,00 0,00 0,00 -0,04 0,01 -0,05
Reallocation -0,38 -0,60 -0,10 -0,01 0,28 0,60
Source : EU KLEMS Database, March 2008, http://www.euklems.net and own calculations.
1970-1995 1995-2005
Accelleration/ Deceleration 
1995-2005/ 1970-1995
Agriculture, while in Spain it was much lower: -1.8 pp for Agriculture versus -0.7 pp for 
Manufacturing. 
Finally, the market services sectors have played a mixed role. Distribution contributed 
noticeably to productivity deceleration, especially Transport and Storage, as well as a 
very important sector for both countries, Hotels and Restaurants, with a somewhat 
higher impact in Spanish productivity deceleration. On the contrary, the Finance and 
Business sector contributed positively in the Spanish case but not so in Italy. 
The last issue that we would like to address in this section relates to the 
similitudes/differences of the two countries’ growth experiences in the most recent 
period. A way to look at them is proposed in figure 3.4, where the relationship between 
the two countries is depicted in terms of labour productivity and its sources of growth 
from the highest level of sectoral disaggregation considered in table 3.19. As can be 
seen, the relationships are not very closed, especially for the contributions of labour 
composition and total capital contribution. However, it is remarkable to observe the 
existing differences between the two forms of capital, with a rather close relationship 
between the two countries in terms of ICT capital contribution, whereas for Non-ICT the 
relation is none existent. Finally, it is also interesting to notice the negative and 
significant correlation between MFP contributions in the two countries, but with a 
negative sign.  
                                                 
 
9 With the exception of sector 23, Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel which has been excluded 
due to its somewhat erratic behaviour.  
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FIGURE 3.4: Labour productivity and contributions to labour productivity. Rates of growth. Italy vs. 
Spain 
(Percentages)   
 
30t33
64
15t1617t19
20
21t22
24
25
26
27t28
2 34t35
36t37C
E
F
AtB
5051
52
60t63
J
71t74
H O
L
M
N70
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Spain
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
It
al
y
Source:  EU KLEMS Database, March 2008, http://www.euklems.net and own calculations.
a) Labour productivity
y=0,157+0,437x                 
(2,312)
R2=0,17
30t33
64
15t16 17t19
20
21t22
24
25
26
27t28
29
34t35
36t37
C
E
F
AtB
50
51
52
60t63
J
71t74
H
O L
M
N
70
-0,2 0,0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1,0
Spain
-0,2
0,0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1,0
It
al
y
b) Labour composition contribution
y=0,381+0,084x               
(0,396)
R2=0,01
30t33 64
15t1617t19
20
21t22
24
25
26
27t2829 3 t35
36t37
C
E
F
AtB
50
51
52 60t63
J
71t74
H
O
L
M
N
70
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4
Spain
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
It
al
y
c) Total capital contribution
y=0,221+0,507x                 
(1,359)
R2=0,06
30t33
64
15t1617t19
20
21t22
24
252627t28
2934t35
36t37
C
E
F
AtB
50 51
52
60t63
J
71t74
H
O
L
M
N
70
0,0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1,0 1,2 1,4 1,6
Spain
0,0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1,0
1,2
1,4
1,6
It
al
y
d) ICT capital contribution
y=0,024+1,3084x               
(6,339)
R2=0,60
30t33
64
15t1617t19
20
21t22
425
26
27t2829 34t35
36t37
C
E
F
AtB
50
51
5260t63
J
71t74
H
O
L
MN
70
-7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Spain
-7
-6
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
It
al
y
e) Non-ICT capital contribution
y=0,115+0,365x                 
(1,023)
R2=0,04
30t33
64
15t16
17t19
20
21t222425
2627t28
9
34t35
36t37C
E
F
AtB
50
51
52
60t63
J
71t74
H
O
L
MN
70
-10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Spain
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
It
al
y
f) MFP contribution
y=-1,935-0,411x                 
(-3,714)
R2=0,34
19    Spain and Italy: Catching up and falling behind. Two different tales of productivity slowdown 
 
 
 
4. INDUSTRY SPECIALIZATION 
Section 3 has already provided an overview of Italy and Spain’s industry specialization. 
In this section we propose an alternative approach, focusing on some given industries 
especially relevant to the economies of the two countries. Section 4.1 provides the level 
and time profile of two productive structure indicators, and sections 4.2 and 4.3 offer the 
results of two shift-share analysis to labour productivity growth for both countries. 
4.1. THE CHANGING COMPOSITION OF PRODUCTION 
In this section we address two related topics: i) the dispersion/concentration of 
production in a number of industries inside each country; and ii) the differences in the 
industries composition of output between pairs of countries/areas.   
We start by addressing the homogeneity of the productive structure within one country. 
The question is: in which country is the production more diversified among different 
sectors/activities? In answering this question, we make use of one of the most popular 
index of dispersion, the coefficient of variation. We apply this index to the share of each 
industry GVA in total Value Added10. Figure 4.1 provides this information. It is clearly 
noticeable that the dispersion of output among the different industries is less pronounced 
in Spain and Italy than in the EU-15 aggregate. It can also be observed that, at the 
beginning of the period, the Spanish economy showed a higher dispersion mainly -as we 
will soon see- as a consequence of the very high weight of just one sector, agriculture. 
Its progressive reduction contributed to reduce the concentration, approaching Spanish 
dispersion among sectors to the one existing in Italy. Both countries reached a minimum 
by the mid-80s. Since then, we can observe a continuous increase of the coefficient of 
variation -or industry composition divergence- not only in Spain and Italy but also in the 
EU-15 aggregate.   
A complementary perspective is provided by an index of differences in industries’ 
composition computed according to [4.1].:  
=
= −∑
1
1 * 100
2
N
AB jA jB
j
L X X         [4.1] 
In 4.1, XjA is the weight of sector j in total economy A in a given moment of time, and XjB 
the corresponding value for country B. The index LAB  -bounded also between 0 and 100- 
measures the magnitude of the differences in an industry’s specialization between pairs 
of economies, showing higher values when the differences are greater. The results of this 
computation appear in figure 4.2. 
 
                                                 
 
10 The same exercise has been replicate using sectoral labour’s share with similar qualitative results. 
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FIGURE 4.1: GVA sectoral dispersion 
(Coefficient of variation of GVA sectoral share in total) 
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FIGURE 4.2: Index of differences in sectoral composition 
(GVA percentages) 
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From figure 4.2 we can conclude the following results. First, the differences between 
Spain and the EU-15 are much more marked than between Italy and the EU-15. Thus, 
the Spanish productive structure is more divergent from the EU-15 average than the 
Italian one. Second, the Italian composition of GVA has been almost continuously 
approaching the EU´s average, with the only exception being in the first oil crisis at the 
beginning of the 70s. Third, Spain followed a similar profile to Italy with respect to the 
EU-15 but with two specificities: i) its intensity has been lower; and ii) the process of 
convergence experienced a reversion since the mid-90s, instead of continuing the 
reduction of the differences as Italy did.  
Finally, when comparing Italy and Spain the most notable fact is the practical constancy 
of the differences in the industries composition of the two countries. Thus, these two 
countries have shown neither convergence nor divergence in their productive structure. 
The only facts worth mentioning are i) the slight increase of the differences around the 
second half of the 80s, after the Spanish entrance into the EU; ii) its subsequent 
reduction in the following years; and iii)  its later rebound in the first few years of the 
new century. Thus, the last five years under analysis, 2000-2005, are marked by a 
divergent composition of Spanish output in relation to both Italy and the EU-15’s 
average.  
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 have been constructed taking into account the 47 individual 
industries considered by the EU KLEMS database. However, it is not hard to identify two 
specific sectors as, at least partly, responsible for the results just shown. Those sectors 
are the agricultural and the construction sectors. Figure 4.3 shows the share of 
employment (hours worked) in total employment in the agricultural sector (panel a) and 
the construction sector (panel b). As before, similar qualitative results can be obtained 
using GVA instead of employment figures.  
As can be seen in panel a) the agricultural sector experienced a marked loss in the 35 
years analyzed. In 1970 it represented almost 30% of the Spanish employment (11.4% 
in terms of GVA), while in 2005 it dropped to a low 5.9% (3.3% in terms of GVA). A 
similar, but less marked path was followed by Italy. In 1970 agricultural employment 
represented 22.6% of total employment (8.7% in terms of GVA). At the end of the 
period, in 2005, its share was only slightly lower than the Spanish one, 5.6% (2.2% in 
terms of GVA).  
The most relevant fact is, however, the convergence process followed by both countries 
over the period. By the end of it, in 2005, the share of the agricultural employment 
(hours worked) in total employment was similar not only between both countries but it 
also converged to the EU-15 share. In terms of GVA the convergence process has not 
been so intense, its share being slightly higher in Spain (3.3%) than in Italy (2.2%) or 
the EU-15 (1.3%). This behaviour has clearly acted in favour of the convergence 
between the two countries and the EU-15. 
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FIGURE 4.3: Share of sector's employment in total employment (hours worked). Agriculture and 
construction. 1970-2005 
(Percentages) 
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The construction sector has shown a different profile. At the beginning of the period, in 
1970, the share in total employment (hours worked) of the construction industry was 
similar in Spain (9.7%), Italy (9.3%) and EU-15 (9.5%). In terms of GVA the shares 
were also similar, around 9%. However, in 2005 things had changed dramatically. While 
in Spain the share of employment had reached almost 14% (13.7%), in Italy it had 
dropped to almost half this figure (7.4%), and in the EU-15 to 8.2%. Thus, the 
behaviour followed by the construction industry in Spain has definitively acted against 
the process of convergence of this country towards both the Italian and the EU-15 
productive structure.  
4.2 LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH AND SPECIALIZATION 
As seen above, data show a deterioration of labour productivity both in Spain and Italy in 
recent years, compared to the EU-15 performance. As we have also seen from different 
perspectives, the industrial dimension seems to play an important role in this evolution 
for both countries. In this section we try to analyze whether the slower productivity 
growth is due to a lesser redistribution of factors towards industries with higher 
productivity levels or/and higher productivity growth (structural change effect), or if it is 
a consequence of an overall slower growth of productivity at industrial level (within-
industry effect). In order to do that we will apply a shift-share analysis to labour 
productivity growth: 
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 [4.2] 
where 0 0T TY L Y L− is the labour productivity growth between years 0 and T, j is the 
industry, and θjT is the share of hours worked in industry j in year T. 
The within-industry effect shows the growth of labour productivity that would have 
occurred even without any structural change. That is, it is due to the aggregate 
productivity gains obtained because of the internal improvements of productivity in each 
industry. The structural change effect captures the effect of the re-allocation of factors 
between sectors towards industries with a higher initial level of labour productivity (static 
effect), or a higher rate of labour productivity growth (dynamic effect). As we can see, 
the static effect is the sum of changes in input shares, weighted by the initial 
productivity levels. It measures the growth of labour productivity due exclusively to the 
change in sector composition, and which would have occurred even without any change 
in the productivity of any sector during the period analysed. The dynamic effect depends 
on the factors of production having been re-allocated to the sectors with higher relative 
growth in labour productivity (in which case the effect is positive) or, on the contrary, to 
the sectors with lower productivity growth (negative effect). Table 4.1 shows the results 
of that shift-share decomposition for two periods: 1970-1995 and 1995-2005. 
TABLE 4.1: Decomposition of productivity growth. Shift-share analysis 
(annual average growth rates, in %) 
a) Italy
1970-1995 1995-2005
Total effect 2,29 0,34
Within-industry effect 1,53 0,61
Structural change effect 0,76 -0,27
b) Spain
1970-1995 1995-2005
Total effect 2,89 0,35
Within-industry effect 2,35 0,33
Structural change effect 0,54 0,01
c) EU-15
1970-1995 1995-2005
Total effect 2,63 1,37
Within-industry effect 2,24 1,46
Structural change effect 0,39 -0,09
Source: EU KLEMS Database, March 2008, http://www.euklems.net and own calculations.  
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Taking the EU-15 as a whole the results show that the within-effect is always more 
important than structural change between sectors. This is very evident for the period 
1970-1995 (2.24% to be compared to 0.39%), but also for the period 1995-2005 
(1.46% and -0.09% respectively). Europe increased and continues increasing its labour 
productivity, mainly through improvements that are internal to the sectors. Structural 
change used to have a smaller positive effect, but nowadays its contribution is almost 
negligible and slightly negative. The slowdown in labour productive is noteworthy, from 
an average growth of 2.63% until the mid-90s to roughly a half of it (1.37%) for the 
period 1995-2005. This decrease of 1.26% is the consequence of simultaneous drops in 
the within-effect (-0.78%), and the structural change effect (-0.48%). 
We will now turn to the results for Spain and Italy in order to see if they follow the same 
pattern, or if we can distinguish any particular characteristic which affects their 
performance in terms of labour productivity. 
The main part of the labour productivity growth in Italy is the within-effect in both 
periods. The internal improvements account for an annual growth rate of 1.53%  from 
1970 to 1995 and 0.61% for the last period. On the other hand, structural change 
accounts only for 0.76% and -0.27% respectively. Structural change has therefore 
played only a minor role in the Italian performance. In fact, its contribution was slightly 
negative during the most recent period.  Looking at the slowdown of productivity in Italy 
during the last few years (-1.95% due to a decrease from 2.29% to 0.34%) data show 
that an overall decrease of -0.92% comes from a slowdown within each industry (within 
effect from 1.53% to 0.61%) and an additional -1.03% is due to the structural change 
(or, in fact, due to a lack of it). 
In the case of Spain the pattern is also of decreasing labour productivity growth The 
reduction is even more noticeable than in Italy. The rate drops from an annual growth of 
2.89% over the period 1970-1995 to just 0.35% for the period 1995-2005, a decrease of 
2.54% over time. Again the main of source of growth is always the internal improvement 
within each sector. The within effect is 2.35% in the first period and 0.33% in the last 
one. The re-allocation of inputs between sectors always seems to be less important 
(structural change effects 0.54% and 0.01% respectively). Similarly to Italy, both effects 
are relevant to explain the slowdown of productivity in Spain, although in this case 
structural change has a less negative contribution than in Italy. The very significant drop 
of the within-industry effect (-2.02%) accounts for as much as 80% of the total 
slowdown of productivity, whereas a worse structural change effect (-0.53%)  represents 
the other 20%.  
Focusing on the last period 1995-2005, our results indicate a common poor performance 
by both Italy and Spain when compared to the EU-15 (approximately -1% of growth per 
year). This contrasts with the previous experience, especially for Spain given that it grew 
faster than the EU-15 over the period 1970-1995. In all cases the main source of labour 
productivity growth is related to the within-effect which is lower in Italy (0.61%), and 
particularly Spain (0.33%), than in the EU-15 (1.46%). Structural change contributes in 
negative way in Italy (-0.27%), the EU-15 (-0.09%) and is positive but very small in 
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Spain (0.01%). In all cases it seems that a more determined effort is necessary to move 
towards “better” industries. During the last few years structural change seems to be 
either too slow (Spain), or even to go in the wrong direction (Italy). Furthermore, a 
general internal slowdown within each industry is also detected in all cases. However, 
this is more significant in Spain where the performance of each industry has been worse 
than in Italy and the EU-15, particularly when compared with the previous trend. For the 
period 1970-1995 Spain showed the highest within-effect, whereas nowadays it shows 
the lowest. 
4.3 LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY LEVELS AND SPECIALIZATION 
Industries can vary extremely in terms of labour productivity due to differences in 
technology, capital deepening, rates of technical change, the use of human capital and 
so on. This being so, the particular sort of industrial specialization of each economy can 
produce important differences in the level of labour productivity between countries. On 
the other hand, a country might simply be best doing the same, and therefore achieve 
more productivity by having a higher level of productivity across industries. Of course a 
country can exploit either one or another or both channels in order to be more 
productive. We can use a shift-share analysis in order to decompose the difference in the 
level of average labour productivity between any two economies A and B: 
( ) ( )θ θ θ θ θ
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where A A B BY L Y L− is the difference in labour productivity between economies A and B, 
j is the industry, and θjC is the share of hours worked in industry j in country C. We use 
labour productivity in terms of GVA per hour worked in PPS at 1995 prices in order to 
make appropiate comparisons. 
The country effect shows the differences in labour productivity that would have occurred 
even without any difference in the industrial specialization. Therefore it is due only to the 
aggregate effect of the internal differences of productivity in each industry. The other 
effects add to the Total specialization effect which captures the impact of the different 
specialization towards high-productivity or low-productivity industries. It captures 
differences which would exist even if each industry had the same productivity in both 
countries. 
Table 4.2 shows the results for a few key years over time as a percentage of the labour 
productivity in the economy of reference in the comparison (EU-15 in sections a and b, 
Italy in section c). 
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TABLE 4.2: Decomposition of productivity growth. Shift-share analysis 
(annual average growth rates, in %) 
a) Italy vs. EU-15
1970 1995 2005
Total effect 15,71 6,25 -4,38
Country effect 84,78 33,58 26,64
Total specialization effect -69,07 -27,34 -31,02
b) Spain vs. EU-15
1970 1995 2005
Total effect -10,42 -4,49 -14,63
Country effect 17,14 5,96 -9,69
Total specialization effect -27,56 -10,46 -4,94
c) Spain vs. Italy
1970 1995 2005
Total effect -22,58 -10,11 -10,05
Country effect -20,29 -12,28 -14,30
Total specialization effect -2,29 2,17 4,26
Source: EU KLEMS Database, March 2008, http://www.euklems.net and own calculations.  
We begin by looking at the differences of Italy and Spain compared with the EU-15. 
Despite the fact that Spain showed a certain ability to converge to the EU-15 over the 
period 1970-1995, during the last ten years all those relative gains vanished. As we can 
see Spain is always below the EU-15, although the difference has shown significant 
changes over time: -10.42% in 1970, -4.49% in 1995 and -14.63% in 2005. The Italian 
experience is quite different because it started above the EU-15 (+15.71% in 1970). 
However, its position worsened continuously over time: in 1995 the positive differential 
was only of 6.25% and the decline went on. In 2005 Italy is already below the EU-15 
with a negative differential of -4.38%. Coming from very different situations, both 
countries have worsened their relative position in a similar proportion, losing some 
10.5% in relative terms with respect to the EU-15 between 1995 and 2005.  
We can also make direct comparisons between Spain and Italy and for this we have 
considered Italy as the benchmark. Spain always has a lower level of productivity, but 
the initial gap (-22.58% in 1970) was already considerably reduced by 1995 (-10.11%). 
Between 1995 and 2005 the gap has remained roughly constant. The initial gap was 
mainly due to Spanish industries being much less productive (country effect of 
-20.29%). The effect of the relative specialization was also negative but smaller 
(-2.29%). Over time Spain has overtaken Italy in terms of specialization (-2.29% in 
1970, +2.17% in 1995 and +4.26% in 2005), which helped to reduce the productivity 
gap. However, the initial within industry convergence in terms of productivity (country 
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effect moving from -20.29% in 1970 to -12.28% in 1995) was followed by a period of 
slow divergence (country effect moving from -12.28% in 1995 to -14.30% in 2005). 
The overall image was of both countries lagging behind the EU-15 with a gap that 
increased between 1995 and 2005. The main problem in the Spanish case is related to 
the relatively poor performance within each industry whereas in Italy the main problem 
seems to be related to its apparent inability to change its industrial structure towards 
more productive sectors.  
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5. THE CHANGING COMPOSITION OF LABOUR 
Over the last few decades, Italy and Spain have experienced significant social changes, 
with the broadening access to higher levels of education for their new generations, the 
growing participation of women in the labour market, and the recent, intense wave of 
immigration from abroad, looking for a job and a better life. All these changes have had 
important effects on the labour market in both countries, and in their overall 
performance in terms of economic growth and labour productivity gains. Additionally, as 
we will see, there are also noticeable differences between both countries in the 
magnitude of these transformations during the last few decades. A specific feature to 
consider is that, in the case of Spain, coming late to most of these changes, everything 
has happened and is still happening much more quickly over a relatively shorter period 
of time. Furthermore, another peculiarity of the Spanish case is related to the labour 
market reforms in Spain from mid-80s onward. These reforms, which create new 
temporary contracts to foster employment, have had far-reaching differential effects. 
GENDER COMPOSITION 
The new role of women in Spain over the last few decades is, without doubt, one of the 
most momentous changes for its society. Following the road transited earlier by other 
developed countries, women began to show an increasing willingness to have a job and a 
full professional career, apart from only managing their homes and devoting their time to 
rearing their children. As late as 1980 the female participation rate11  was only 28.3% in 
Spain and 32% in Italy. Those levels were clearly much lower than the ones 
corresponding to males in both countries (76.6% and 69.9% respectively). As figure 5.1 
shows, both countries have increased their female participation rates over the period 
1980-2005, just as the activity rates of men were experiencing the opposite trend.  
Nowadays the gender difference is still wide but less than it was a couple of decades ago. 
However, this qualitatively similar evolution has had a very different intensity in Spain 
and Italy, being stronger in Spain and coming very close to a 45% participation rate at 
the end of the period (an increase of some 17 points). The Italian experience is more 
moderate (with a female activity rate of 37% in recent years after an increase of only 5 
points), and the result is the inversion of the relative positions. Nowadays female activity 
rates are higher in Spain than in Italy.  One of the consequences of all this is the 
divergent evolution of the overall participation rate in each country. In Spain activity 
rates grow over the period, in spite of the decrease of participation among men, 
beginning at 50% levels and finishing at 56%. In Italy activity rates fall from 50% to 
48%. Therefore, an increasing amount of labour has been made available for firms in net 
terms in Spain due to the change in female behaviour, but less so in Italy. 
                                                 
 
11 Unlike the previous section, all participation rates are now defined as shares over the population aged 15 or 
more. 
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FIGURE 5.1: Activity rates. 1980-2005 
(Percentages) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The gender mix of employment is actually quite different from the 1980 situation. Figure 
5.2 shows how the female share in total hours worked has risen between 1980 and 2005 
from 32% to 40.6% in Italy and from 28.8% to 38.8% in Spain. A change as important 
as this may have had significant effects on the labour supply and the economic 
performance of both countries. 
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FIGURE 5.2: Female share in total hours worked 
(Percentages) 
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Source : EU KLEMS Database, March 2008, http://www.euklems.net and own calculations.
 
SKILL COMPOSITION 
Human Capital is a field where we find even more significant differences over time 
between Italy and Spain. These can be important in understanding the relative economic 
performance of both countries too. Undoubtedly human capital is always a somewhat 
tricky question due to the complex and quite intangible nature of this factor. Therefore, 
some problems of comparability and measurement are always warranted, and 
unavoidable to a certain extent. 
Figure 5.3 shows the educational attainment of workers in Spain. We can see a huge 
change in Spain from 1980 to 2005. High skilled workers are 7.9% of hours worked in 
1980 and 21.6% in 2005. Medium skilled workers are 7.3% in 1980 and 32.2% in 2005. 
Low skilled workers decrease from 84.8% to 46.1%. (We should also add that the skill 
mix of this last group is also much better in 2005 compared to 1980, as we will see 
below) 
The Italian experience is completely different (figure 5.4). Looking once again at the 
skills of workers, we can see a more static picture. High skilled workers are 4.7% of total 
hours worked in 1980 and 12.8% in 2005. Almost every worker is a medium skilled one 
(87.3% in 1980 and 86.1% in 2005). Low skilled workers are a small and decreasing 
minority over all the period (7.9% in 1980 and 1.2% in 2005).  
However, there are some apparent problems of comparability related to the labour 
composition data in Italy and Spain due to the use of aggregates which are too big. We 
will focus on the completed schooling composition of labour and, therefore, we will be 
able to make accurate comparisons, while leaving aside other sources of human capital 
different from formal education. Nevertheless, this schooling dimension is the one 
showing the biggest transformation during the last few decades. 
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FIGURE 5.3: Skill composition hours worked. Spain. 1980-2005 
(Percentages) 
Source : EU KLEMS Database, March 2008, http://www.euklems.net and own calculations.
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FIGURE 5.4: Skill composition hours worked. Italy. 1980-2005 
(Percentages) 
Source : EU KLEMS Database, March 2008, http://www.euklems.net and own calculations.
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Figure 5.5 shows the educational attainment composition of labour in Spain. We can 
distinguish the share of total hours worked corresponding to workers with no formal 
qualifications; with only compulsory schooling (low intermediate); post-compulsory non-
university education; and university education. The improvement is huge indeed. 
University graduates grow from 7.9% in 1980 to 21.6% in 2005. Post-compulsory 
education grows from 7.3% to 32.2%. Compulsory education also rises from 10.3% to 
28.7%. All schooling levels above the lowest one improve their shares over the period in 
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a sustained way. Meanwhile, workers with no qualifications move from being 74.5% to 
only 17.4%. It is quite clear that the Spanish labour force has changed from being 
characterized by an almost complete lack of formal education to a very different and 
much more favourable position. 
FIGURE 5.5: Labour composition. Spain. 1980-2005 
(Percentages) 
Source : EU KLEMS Database, March 2008, http://www.euklems.net, INE and own 
calculations.
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Italy represents a different case. It has also experienced some significant improvements 
in the educational attainment of its workers, but the process is slower and begins in 
1980 from an already much better point of departure. Figure 5.6 shows the Italian 
performance over the same period 1980-2005. University graduates increase their share 
from 4.7% to 12.8%. Post-compulsory education grows strongly from 44% to 71.1%. On 
the other hand, compulsory education falls from 43.3% to 14.9%, and workers with no 
qualifications move from being a small 7.9% to a negligible 1.2% in 2005.  
Therefore, what we can observe is the differential situation of Spain coming a few 
decades late to a more universal provision of education, a situation achieved some time 
ago by other more developed countries. Italy is to a certain extent one of those 
countries. In 1980 Spain had already enforced compulsory education until 14 years of 
age (this compulsory level was then increased to 16 years by law in 1986) for the new 
cohorts of age since 1970. However, there are no education miracles and time is 
necessary for these new age cohorts to substitute the older ones in the labour force. It is 
a slow and gradual process, although in Spain this has been and still is under way at a 
very good speed. The result is a more dramatic improvement of the skill mix of labour in 
Spain than in Italy during the period.  
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FIGURE 5.6: Labour composition. Italy. 1980-2005 
(Percentages) 
Source : EU KLEMS Database, March 2008, http://www.euklems.net, Istat and own 
calculations.
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In order to get a more synthetic image we may use an indicator such as the average 
years of schooling in Spain and Italy (figure 5.7). It summarizes all these educational 
transformations mentioned above.  In Spain this indicator rises from 7 years in 1980 to 
11.4 years in 2005, while in Italy it moves from 11.2 years to 12.8 years. Thus, Spain is 
always below Italy in the average schooling of its workers. In fact, Spain recently 
achieved the Italian 1980 overall levels in 2005. On the other hand, the catching up is 
undeniable: Spanish accumulated growth is 63% over the period, compared to a mere 
15% in Italy; and the 1980 gap (Spanish average years being only 62% of Italian levels) 
is closing steadily (89% of Italian levels in 2005). 
We find more significant differences between Spain and Italy when we look at the 
industry level. First of all, there is a lot of heterogeneity in terms of labour composition in 
both countries. Figure 5.8 shows the industrial coefficient of variation of the share of 
workers with high skills. We get high values indicating those important differences, which 
in 1980 are even slightly bigger in Spain than in Italy. However, during the period 1980-
2005, we can see a process of increasing homogeneity in Spain. The Spanish coefficient 
of variation in 2005 is half the one in 1980. However, in Italy the level of heterogeneity, 
after a brief decrease until the early 90s, remains in 2005 at a level very similar to the 
one in 1980. Therefore, we have a kind of universal improvement in labour composition 
affecting the whole Spanish economy. On the other hand, high skilled workers remain 
much more concentrated in some industries in Italy. 
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FIGURE 5.7: Average years of schooling by hour worked 
1980-2005 
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Source : EU KLEMS Database, March 2008, http://www.euklems.net, INE, Istat and own 
calculations.
 
FIGURE 5.8: Industrial coefficient of variation (share high skills) 
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Source : EU KLEMS Database, March 2008, http://www.euklems.net and own calculations.
 
The effect of all these different time patterns in both countries should show in their 
relative performance in terms of labour productivity and economic growth. With its 
labour force still more qualified, Italy has a source to obtain a higher level of labour 
productivity than Spain. On the other hand, Spain should have benefited from a faster 
improving quality of labour which should have made feasible the achievement of higher 
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levels of both labour productivity (catching up with Italy), and economic growth.  
However, there is the risk that these educational improvements might not transform into 
more productivity, at least in the short run. Those young workers with more schooling 
enter the labour market lacking experience initially. The full benefits of more schooling 
on productivity may come only after some time when they are combined with a 
reasonable amount of all those components of human capital different from formal 
education. 
A simultaneous look at both hours worked and labour compensation by skills can be very 
informative. Table 5.1 shows a general trend of improving skills in all developed areas, 
with the share of university graduates (high skill workers) in the total hours worked 
increasing steadily over the last decades. Italy and Spain, as is the overall case for the 
EU-15, show the strongest growth in relative terms, well above those of Japan and the 
U.S. The Spanish case is striking because it has a very good situation when considering 
university graduates, although we have seen that Spain still lacks intermediate 
education. In fact it is above the European average in this field.  
TABLE 5.1: Share of high skill workers in total 
1980 1995 2005 1980 1995 2005 1980 1995 2005
Italy 4,7 7,8 12,8 6,1 9,5 17,9 1,29 1,23 1,41
Spain 7,9 15,5 21,6 16,3 26,6 35,3 2,07 1,71 1,63
Japan 12,9 19,1 26,3 20,4 29,2 37,2 1,58 1,53 1,41
USA 20,2 27,3 31,7 27,8 41,1 48,1 1,38 1,50 1,52
EU-15 ex 5,8 10,7 15,1 11,5 18,4 24,1 1,96 1,72 1,60
Source:  EU KLEMS Database, Marzo 2008, http://www.euklems.net and own calculations.
Hours worked Labour compensation
Labour compensation 
share/hours share
 
We also find a general trend in increasing shares of labour compensation going to 
university graduates, which was only to be expected. Again, Italy, Spain and the 
European countries in general present more intense increases in relative terms than 
Japan or the US. In 2005 Spain shows a very high share (35.3%) comparable to Japan 
and only below the US (48.1%). Italy is well below (17.9% in 2005), although it shows a 
high relative growth in the last decade (its share being only 9.5% in 1995). In all cases, 
the shares in labour compensation are higher than in hours worked. This reflects the 
better quality of this type of labour and its higher wages. By looking at the ratio of both 
shares we may obtain some useful insights into the evolution of the returns to labour 
quality and, therefore, its impact on labour productivity.   
Notice that Italy always shows the smallest ratio, this fact indicating a somewhat weak 
return to schooling. We should also expect a weak effect on productivity coming from the 
increase in the share of university graduates in the Italian labour force, which might be 
one of the reasons for the low Italian propensity to graduate at university.  On the other 
hand, the ratio even increases slightly from 1980 to 2005, which is different from the 
general trend in other countries. 
In Spain the ratio is the highest, showing strong returns to schooling. We should also 
expect a strong effect on productivity coming from the increasing share of university 
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graduates. This may be one of the reasons for the high Spanish propensity to enter 
university after completing intermediate schooling. On the other hand, the ratio 
decreases a lot between 1980 (2.07) and 2005 (1.63). As a result, nowadays it is close 
to the other countries. We could think that the great increase in the supply of high skill 
workers in Spain has significantly reduced its apparent relative productivity, possibly 
because they are employed inefficiently (i.e. in industries or jobs that do not require 
those qualifications, generating over-education), or because they still lack the labour 
experience needed to exploit the potential benefits of their schooling. In that case, 
perhaps we should not expect such considerable improvements in productivity in Spain 
as a result of the increase in schooling. 
It is interesting to note that all these results contrast with the US, which improve its ratio 
significantly over the period. 
MIGRANTS AND LABOUR COMPOSITION 
Immigration is the biggest labour market shock experienced in Spain during the last 
decade. This issue is relevant because empirical results show that migrant’s insertion into 
the labour market has distinctive features with effects on the overall economic 
performance. Migrants concentrate in a few industries (such as construction, agriculture, 
hotels and restaurants, or domestic services) and in jobs that do no require 
qualifications. In addition to suffering more from over education problems, migrants 
have more difficulties in finding a job, though only in the short run, and finally, 
temporary contracts are also more prevalent for this collective in the medium run.  
Figure 5.9 shows the share of immigrants in total employment over the period 1987-
2007. In 1987 migrant workers were negligible in Spain. In fact, as late as 2000 they 
only represented a mere 2.9% of total employment. However, we can see a huge 
increase during the last few years, and nowadays their share is 13.5%. From 2000 to 
2007, some 2.2 million immigrant workers arrived. An increase of that size in the labour 
supply has had very significant effects on the Spanish economy. On the one hand, it has 
made feasible the huge increase of employment in Spain during the last few years and 
also the high rate of GPD growth, both well above the other European countries. On the 
other hand, it contributes to explaining the disappointing behaviour of labour productivity 
during the last and lengthy period of fast economic growth in Spain. Migrants are 
workers who need more extended periods of adjustment, with specific difficulties to 
apply their labour quality in a new and foreign labour market. Immigration has fostered 
the creation of new jobs in activities and occupations of low productivity and low wages. 
Italy has also experienced an influx of migrants from abroad recently. Although it has 
been greater than in the whole of the European Union, foreigners still represent only 6% 
of total employment in 2006, a figure very similar to the EU15 average and far below 
Spain. The effects should be therefore less intense than in Spain both in terms of 
employment creation and labour productivity growth. 
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FIGURE 5.9: Share of migrants in total employment 
(Percentages) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TEMPORARY CONTRACTS 
A final and very specific feature of labour composition change in Spain during the period 
is due to the policy adopted from mid-80s onward in order to curb unemployment. With 
unemployment rates well over 20%, the need of reducing some of the rigidities affecting 
an overprotective labour market was recognized. However, it was decided to restrict the 
flexibilization only to the new employment, without changing the conditions of the 
already existing contracts. Spanish firms have been able to hire new employees and 
dismiss them without costs at the expiration date of the contract. This possibility was 
avidly used by Spanish firms as figure 5.10 shows. 
The share of temporary employment rose very quickly in Spain from being close to 10% 
in the mid-80s to 30%-35% in the 90s and continues at those levels nowadays. This 
contrasts sharply with other European countries, and in particular with Italy where the 
share has also risen, being 13.1% in 2006. Nevertheless, this type of employment only 
represented some 5% of employees during the 80s, growing to 10% in 2000, always 20-
25% below the Spanish contemporary levels. In fact, Italy has maintained its share of 
temporary employment below even the EU15 average, while Spain is the foremost 
example of temporary contracts. 
Indeed, all this stimulated the creation of new jobs in Spain, and is one of the reasons 
for its great increase of employment. On the other hand, this also provoked a marked 
increase of workers and jobs’ turnover. With new workers firms keep the option of 
eliminating jobs without costs if they should decide to do so in the future. Transforming 
the contract into a standard fixed contract implied losing that possibility and risking 
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future high firing costs. This is one of the reasons for the poor performance of Spain in 
terms of labour productivity growth: people keep moving from one employment to 
another without being able to capitalize fully on the previous on-the-job experience. Jobs 
are therefore continually being occupied by people still lacking the specific skills to do 
them. 
FIGURE 5.10: Share of temporary employees 
(Percentages) 
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6. CONCLUSIONS  
This chapter attempts to provide an overview of Spanish and Italian growth performance. 
It starts decomposing per capita income growth in four determinants, concluding that 
labour productivity is its main determinant. The higher number of hours worked in Italy 
has acted in favour of its relatively higher per capita income, while its lower activity rate 
has exerted the opposite force. On the other hand, the very high Spanish unemployment 
rate pushed down its relatively lower per capita income until the beginning of the new 
century.   
In the last fifteeen years the two countries have shown a very different profile in almost 
all variables, but productivity. In Spain, the low productivity growth observed during the 
past two decades is related to a sustained increase in real GDP characterized by an even 
more massive increase in employment and, in some industries, by an intensive capital 
accumulation. By contrast, Italy has experienced a poor performance in productivity 
growth due to stagnation in demand and losses of competitiveness, which have dwarfed 
the possibility of increasing the output level in many industries.  
From the Value Added perspective, Spain has shown a much more dynamic behaviour 
than Italy in almost all sectors and sources of growth. This is particularly true in terms of 
labour creation, where the increase in Spain’s employment has been very intense. The 
Construction industry is in part responsible for this strong upsurge. However, the three 
service sectors aggregations that we are considering have also shown  a big push in 
Spain, not shared by Italy in the case of Distribution. On the other hand, the growth rate 
of Value Added in the Manufacturing (MaxElec) sector was the lowest one in the two 
countries. But, while employment increased in Spain, it experienced a slight reduction in 
Italy. Finally, together with the sluggish pace of growth in manufacturing, a second 
feature shared by the two countries is the almost general negative contribution of MFP to 
GDP growth, of which only the Elecom industry in Italy and Finbu in Spain escape  
If a diagnosis had to be made about the productivity deceleration in both countries, the 
Agriculture sector must be put at the forefront. However, its negative contribution should 
be judged as the standard outcome of the transition from a backward rural economy to a 
modern one dominated by the service sectors. In Spain, the construction industry has to 
bear the highest responsibility for the productivity slowdown, whereas Italy has suffered 
a very negative behaviour in manufacturing. The impact of the services sectors has been 
mixed in both countries. While the four sectors included in the Non-Market services 
aggregation almost contributed positively in both countries, the opposite happened with 
the Distribution aggregation, especially for Transport and Storage. Finally, in the case of 
Spain, Hotels and Restaurants and Private households with employed persons played a 
very negative role, whereas a high responsibility of the productivity slowdown in Italy 
should also be blamed on the Renting of machinery and equipment, and other business 
activities.  
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The two shift-share exercises presented in section 4 have provided additional insights. 
Focusing on the last period 1995-2005, the results indicate a common poor performance 
by both Italy and Spain when compared to the EU-15. This contrasts with the previous 
experience, especially for Spain because it grew faster that the EU-15 over the period 
1970-1995. It seems that a more determined effort is necessary to move towards 
“better” industries. During the last few years, structural change seems to be either too 
slow (Spain), or even to go in the wrong direction (Italy). In addition, a general internal 
slowdown within each industry can also be detected in both cases. However, this is more 
significant in Spain where the performance of each industry has been worse than in Italy 
and the EU-15, particularly when compared with the previous trend.  
A common reason for the lower relative productivity in both countries is their 
specialization in less productive industries. Furthermore, Spain has additional problems 
because overall it is less productive in each industry compared to the EU-15, whereas in 
Italy we find the opposite. Italy has a clear problem of an inadequate industrial 
specialization, although it has a good performance industry to industry. Spain still has a 
specialization problem - although it is smaller, - and moreover, its industry to industry 
performance is worse.  
Looking at the evolution of the data over time we can appreciate a consistent shift of 
Spain towards a better specialization. At the same time the position of each industry in 
terms of productivity has generally worsened when compared with the EU-15. For Italy 
the consistent process is one of progressive loss of its initial within industry advantage 
compared to the EU-15, whereas the shift towards better sectors (which happened 
between 1970 and 1995) stopped afterwards. As we have seen, the specialization shift 
seems to be in the wrong direction from 1995 onwards. 
After having reviewed in section 5 some of the main distinguishing changes in the labour 
composition in Spain and Italy, we can attempt to state a few conclusions. We can look 
at the Spanish experience as an example of a “quantity” type of growth. After a period of 
serious unemployment problems, it finally became very successful in creating 
employment and using more labour. Those workers came from the increasing female 
participation rates and from immigration from abroad, and very often joined the labour 
market through a series of temporary contracts in quick succession. There is also a big 
improvement in terms of the number of workers with more schooling. On the other hand, 
we notice serious and persistent problems as far as improving labour productivity is 
concerned. Some of them are also related to the changing composition of labour 
mentioned, others to the growing inability to use the increasing quality of labour 
efficiently (at least in the short run or at least to a sufficient degree).  
Compared to the Spanish turmoil during the last few decades, the Italian case is quieter 
and more gradual. In 1980 Italy had already digested part of those changes mentioned 
for Spain (women and labour market, schooling improvements and so on). During the 
period those trends took place but at a more relaxed pace, possibly too relaxed. 
Therefore, returns to quality have been maintained over the period. On the other hand, 
the rhythm of improvement in labour quality, and the ability to create employment do 
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not compare well with Spain. And despite there being no turmoil in Italy, there is the 
potential risk of relative stagnation. 
The Spain-Italy comparison has revealed different stories of economic growth, 
notwithstanding the apparent similarities with productivity performance.  The two 
countries need to be reformed in their approach to regulation policies and their 
protectionist attitude with respect to national incumbents. The service sectors have to be 
made more efficient especially because of their pervasiveness in all the industries of the 
economy. Italy's position seems to be more worrisome, given the fact that negative 
productivity performance is not related to a process of a high growth in output. Spain is 
a more dynamic economy and could rely on a higher capital accumulation to trigger 
increases in MFP in the near future.  This comparison could be repeated in a multilateral 
context, where the results obtained can be linked to those of third-party countries in a 
more general perspective. 
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